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Resetting U.S.-Turkish Relations: 
Charting a New Way Forward
Aaron Stein  
                         Independent Foreign Policy Analyst
Introduction
Traditionally, the United States' policy in the Middle East has been based 
on ensuring Israeli security and maintaining access to Gulf oil. Following 
the division of the Middle East at the Yalta Conference, the United States 
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ire of the United States. In tandem, Turkey's relations with Israel, Wash-
ington's closest ally in the region, have deteriorated rapidly following 
Israel's war in Gaza and the events aboard the Mavi Marmara. These 
coinciding events have further complicated U.S.-Turkish relations and 
have led a number of pundits in Washington to openly question Turkey's 
ideological orientation. If Ankara and Washington want to mend relations 
they should acknowledge that their disagreements are not about their 
overall vision or intention for the region, but over how to implement and 
carry out foreign policy. Both Ankara and Washington should do a better 
job of enumerating their long-term regional policy goals and engage in a 
broader dialogue to clearly transmit these ideas to each other, while work-
ing together to achieve them.
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gradually replaced Great Britain and France as the dominant power in the 
Middle East. After the onset of the Cold War, the United States and the 
Soviet Union sought to control the region's vast oil reserves. The United 
States was principally concerned with the spread of Arab nationalist gov-
ernments that allied themselves with the Soviet Union. For the United 
States, the festering Middle Eastern conflicts were viewed through a Cold 
War lens and were thought of as part of the global competition between 
the United States and the Soviet Union.
The Cold War backdrop was the impetus for the close relations with Iran 
and Turkey. The United States' Middle East strategy emphasized arming 
its allies in order to limit the likelihood of committing its troops abroad to 
help secure its vital interests. Iran and Turkey were both front-line states 
that the United States counted on to help repel any attack by the Soviet 
Union and the Warsaw Pact. In both cases, the United States poured in 
billions of dollars of advanced military equipment to bolster these two 
countries' military capabilities, and, at the same time, help ensure that 
they remained in the United States' sphere of influence.
The theoretical underpinning for the United States' strategy was the belief 
in containment, using military, economic, and diplomatic strategies to 
help prevent the spread of Communism. After the fall of the Soviet Union, 
the United States found itself in an unrivaled position of power in the 
Middle East. Former President Bill Clinton implemented "dual contain-
ment," a U.S. strategy to economically and militarily isolate Iran and Iraq. 
The United States' new policy emphasized coercion and military superior-
ity, rather than American "soft power." These sentiments were strength-
ened under former President George W. Bush and the contemporaneous 
ascendance of an American neo-conservative foreign policy that advo-
cated for—and eventually succeeded in—overthrowing Saddam Hussein.
Turkey's geostrategic position made it an indispensable U.S. ally during 
the Cold War and its aftermath. The U.S. Air Force base in Adana, Turkey 
was used to enforce the Iraqi no-fly zones, allowing the United States to 
maintain a strong military presence on Iran's northwestern border. How-
ever, in the years following the Cold War, Turkey set about mending its 
relations with Iran, as part of a larger effort to quell Kurdish separatism 
and diversify its suppliers of natural gas. In addition, the election of the 
Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AK Party, or Justice and Development Party) 
in 2001 ushered in a new government interested in strengthening Tur-
key's ties to the Middle East. They brought with them a new foreign policy 
concept that emphasized "soft power" and "a zero problems with your 
neighbors" foreign policy.
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As a result, the United States and Turkey find themselves at odds over 
how to implement policy in the Middle East. This ideological disagree-
ment has strained relations between the two allies. However, Turkey's for-
eign policy is not, as some right-wing pundits claim, a product of its prime 
minster's religious sympathies. Instead, it is part of an overall effort to 
improve Turkey's position in an economically and militarily important 
region. In fact, the United States and Turkey share many of the same 
goals for the Middle East. The fundamental difference between the United 
States and Turkey is how each intends to implement its current Middle 
East policy.
Unless both countries make an effort to better understand each other's 
intentions in the Middle East, the alliance will continue to be marred by 
misunderstandings and unfair accusations about overall intention. Presi-
dent Obama's renewed emphasis on diplomacy to help resolve the Iran 
nuclear issue has certainly helped clarify the United States' position vis-à-
vis Iran. However, uncertainties over each other's overall intentions 
remain, as evidenced by Turkey's recent decision to vote "no" on the latest 
round of UN Security council sanctions against Iran. To better under-
stand how Iran influences U.S.-Turkey relations, we need to analyze the 
theoretical underpinnings of Turkey's new foreign policy and chart the 
history of Turkish-Iranian relations.
Turkey's New Middle East Policy: Re-Engaging with 
Its Ottoman Past
Turkey has set about mending relations with its Arab and non-Arab 
neighbors, and is seeking to re-establish its ties with the Middle East. 
After years of benign neglect, Turkey's current government, the AK Party, 
has re-engaged with the former provinces in the Ottoman Empire. Tur-
key's new policy is based on what its current foreign minister, Ahmet 
Davutogolu, calls "strategic depth"—a foreign policy seeking to balance 
Turkey's relations with the West and its former Ottoman provinces in the 
South and East.1 The policy includes a conscious effort to establish strong 
security and economic ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran, along with 
other countries in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.
At the outset, the West encouraged Turkey's new assertive foreign policy, 
believing that Turkey could serve as a vital diplomatic actor in the Middle 
East. The European Union believed that Turkey's unique position in the 
region could facilitate diplomacy and help solve some of the intractable 
conflicts that have been festering in the Middle East. President Obama 
chose Turkey as the first Muslim country to visit after being elected presi-
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dent and called Turkey a "strategic partner."2 Turkey was an active partic-
ipant in the Middle East peace process and facilitated talks between Israel 
and Syria.3 These new diplomatic initiatives reflect the AK Party's belief 
that dialogue and diplomacy are the best tools to resolve international 
disputes. Turkey has chosen to use its "soft power" to implement its "zero 
problems" foreign policy instead of relying on coercion. Despite the diplo-
matic accolades, Turkey's new outlook has drawn the ire of the United 
States and some European countries because of their long-standing com-
mitment to a coercive foreign policy in the Middle East and their determi-
nation to isolate Iran.
Turkey's recent rapprochement with Iran has drawn the ire of the United 
States because of: Turkey's swift recognition of President Ahmedinejad 
after the controversial 2009 election, Prime Minister Erdogan's 
unabashed support of Iran's nuclear enrichment program, Turkey's (and 
Brazil's) separate fuel-swap agreements with Iran, and its "no" vote on the 
recent UN Security Council sanctions against Iran. These developments 
coincided with the recent collapse of Turkish-Israeli relations following 
Israel's bombing of Gaza and the tragic incident on the Mavi Marmara. 
In tandem, Turkish-Iranian economic relations have flourished during a 
time when the United States and its Western allies have implemented a 
number of unilateral sanctions designed to limit Iran's banks and prevent 
Iran's import of refined petroleum. The Turkish Government has said that 
it will only comply with the UN Security Council sanctions, and does not 
feel that it is legally obligated to comply with the United States' and Euro-
pean Union's unilateral sanctions.4
The current Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has consistently 
stated his opposition to an Iranian nuclear weapon, but has fervently iter-
ated his belief that Iran has the right to nuclear enrichment and the pur-
suit of a peaceful nuclear-energy program.5 By refusing to take a more 
proactive stance against Iran's nuclear program, some Western Security 
officials argue that Turkey's current government is blunting international 
efforts to curtail Iran's enrichment program. Some suggest that Turkey is 
"turning east," in reference to the current government's alleged "Islamist 
sympathies."6 Erdogan's comments and Turkey's activist foreign policy 
have cast a shadow over U.S.-Turkish relations. Perhaps, most impor-
tantly, these developments have overshadowed the fact that both coun-
tries share many of the same strategic goals in the Middle East. Both seek 
to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle 
East, have a vested interest in supporting Iraq's dysfunctional govern-
ment, are committed to combating terrorism, and seek a just solution to 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
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The problem is that both countries are at loggerheads over how to go 
about implementing their strategic objectives. The United States, in keep-
ing with its policy of "containment," has imposed strict financial sanctions 
and continues to arm Tehran's traditional enemies.7 With regards to the 
United States' Iran policy, Ankara views sanctions suspiciously, believing 
that their implementation may eventually lead to war or limited military 
action.8 Instead, Ankara believes that robust diplomacy, combined with 
deep economic and cultural ties, will help Ankara shape Iranian behavior. 
They believe that an isolated Iran is more likely to lash out to bolster 
domestic legitimacy, and the results of any armed conflict will seriously 
threaten Turkey's economy. Furthermore, Ankara does not actually 
believe that sanctions will work, arguing that the gradual ratcheting up of 
sanctions only helps the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) 
solidify its control over Iran's black-market economy. Thus, at the end of 
the day, the current sanctions policy will do little to limit Iran's nuclear 
program and will make the likelihood of military action more plausible. 
Drawing on its experience during the Gulf War, Turkey is adamantly 
opposed to any military action because the resulting chaos, they believe, 
will undermine Turkish economic growth and will exacerbate problems 
faced by its Kurdish minority.
Even though the United States and Turkey share many of the same goals 
in the region, they have set about implementing policy differently. Tur-
key's Iran policy will help determine how the international community 
deals with the perceived problems posed by Iran's progressing nuclear 
program. Turkey's longstanding alliance with the West and its renewed 
commitment to strengthen relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors 
will continue to impact the global response to Iran's nuclear program and 
shape the ongoing debate about the most appropriate response to Iran's 
refusal to comply with the United Nations Security Council. Turkey's Iran 
policy will also continue to impact its relations with the United States, the 
world's lone superpower and the guarantor of Turkish security. Further-
more, Turkey's recent desire to position itself as a mediator in the Middle 
East may offer the West another diplomatic tool to help facilitate dialogue 
between itself and Iran. However, in order for both sides to fully take 
advantage of Turkey's diplomatic enthusiasm, they must first understand 
the underpinning of each other's Iran policy. Thus, each side can identify 
the areas where their policies converge, which in turn will help the West 
and Turkey better coordinate their diplomatic efforts in the future.
To do so, the United States should make an effort to better understand 
Iran's and Turkey's long history of relations. By doing so, the United 
States will better understand the historical elements that continue to 
shape the two countries' relationship. This will allow the United States to 
Stein: Resetting U.S.-Turkish Relations: Charting a New Way Forward
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
Journal of Strategic Security
6
better understand Turkish intentions in Iran. The history of the two coun-
tries' relations reveals a complex nexus of competing religious ideology 
and mistrust, but also the absence of armed conflict since the current bor-
der was delineated nearly five centuries ago. In order for the United States 
and Turkey to move forward and coordinate their Middle East policies, it 
is necessary for the West to understand the history of Turkish-Iranian 
relations.
Historical Background: Iranian-Turkish Relations
The foundation of Turkish-Iranian relations is a shared sense of national 
identity that stems from a common history of powerful empires that were 
usurped by imperialism. Both countries are home to historic Middle East-
ern empires that controlled large swaths of territory in the Middle East 
and Central Asia. The two former empires shared a number of cultural 
and religious similarities. Iran's Safavid Empire was a source of great 
inspiration for the Anatolian Turkmens who were dissatisfied with the 
bureaucratic centralism of the Ottoman Empire during the fifteenth cen-
tury.9 During the Ottoman-Safavid war of 1514, the Ottoman Empire con-
quered Eastern and Western Anatolia and present day Azerbijan. 
Subsequently, the Ottomans successfully conquered the territory of mod-
ern-day Iraq from the Safavids in 1534. The two Empires relentlessly 
fought over the two territories encompassing Baghdad and Mosul before 
eventually signing the Kasr-ı Şırın Treaty in 1639, which delineated Iran's 
and Turkey's current border and granted control of the Iraqi territories to 
the Ottomans.10
Modern-day leaders in Iran and Turkey often point to the 1639 Peace 
Treaty as a symbol for the two country's long history of amicable and 
peaceful relations. Despite the lofty diplomatic rhetoric, tensions sur-
rounding Safavid Shi'ism and "the Ottoman version of Islamic Ortho-
doxy" continued to influence and undermine relations between the two 
countries for hundreds of years after the signing of the Kasr-ı Şırın 
Treaty. The simmering tensions were finally resolved in 1847 after Qajar 
Persia and Ottoman Turkey signed the Treaty of Erzurum.11 Relations 
remained stable up until the turn of the century and turned for the worse 
at the onset of the First World War.
Following the First World War, Turkey's Mustafa Kemal [Ataturk] and 
Iran's Reza Khan implemented a number of top-down secular nationalist 
reforms. The imposition of these reforms led to domestic turmoil and sep-
aratist activity. The chaos that ensued continues to influence Iran's and 
Turkey's social and national security policies and underpins the two coun-
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tries' relationship to this day. Both leaders adopted platforms emphasiz-
ing independence, universal secular education, equality, and the 
centralization of Turkish and Farsi, respectively, as the official language 
of the state.12 In both cases the country leaders tapped into the popula-
tion's nascent nationalism to muster political legitimacy to gain power for 
their nationalist movements. The advocacy of a staunch secular national-
ist ideology, combined with the two countries' heterogeneous demo-
graphic, led to civil strife and unrest among large segments of the 
population.13 To quell the violence, leaders in both countries set about 
creating a new sense of national identity. In Turkey, Ataturk propagated 
the notion of a uni-ethnic Turkish society, while in Iran the Shah propa-
gated Persian nationalism. In both cases, religion was seen as the source 
of the country's fragility and the root cause of society's social problems.14
Early Iranian and Turkish policies also reflect the geo-strategic reality of 
the post-World War I world. Both Turkey and Iran are non-Arab-majority 
Muslim states that are located in geographically unstable areas. As such 
their early security policies were geographically centered, and focused on 
maintaining friendly relations with neighboring states and on respecting 
state sovereignty. Thus, during this time period, Iran and Turkey did not 
adopt a foreign policy based on the subversion of national sovereignty, as 
did other states in the Middle East.15 Instead, the two states worked to 
quell domestic unrest and consolidate the power of the new nationalist 
governments.
At the outset of the Cold War, Turkey and Iran adopted a pro-Western 
foreign policy. Driven by a nascent fear of Soviet expansion, Turkey and 
Iran actively sought an alliance with the Western powers to help bolster 
their defenses in the event of a Soviet attack. This is evidenced by the two 
countries' participation in the short-lived, and ultimately unsuccessful, 
Baghdad Pact (and the follow-on organization CENTO) and the informal 
"alliance of the periphery" with Israel.16 During the early days of the Cold 
War, Iran's and Turkey's strategic locations were of great importance to 
the new security paradigm taking shape in the Middle East. Both coun-
tries came to be front-line Cold War states and were expected to resist any 
military encroachments by the Soviet Union. The United States, in an 
effort to exert its influence and control in the Middle East, provided both 
countries with billions of dollars worth of advanced military equipment 
and training.
The geo-strategic significance of the Bosporus Straits, deft Turkish diplo-
macy, and Turkey's proximity to the Soviet Union's oil fields in present-
day Azerbijan ultimately led the United States to invite Turkey to join the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952.17 Turkey's inclusion 
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in the Alliance increased its access to American-supplied military equip-
ment and led to the establishment of the region's most powerful military. 
According to John Calebrese in his article Turkey and Iran: Limits of a 
Stable Relationship, "Turkey's privileged status in the Western alliance 
aroused the Shah's envy, but did not damage Turco-Iranian relations."18 
"Instead, both countries were more concerned about the rise of rival pow-
ers in the region—Greece in the case of Turkey, and the spread of Arab 
nationalism in Iraq and Egypt in the case of Iran."19 The two countries' 
views on security reflected their attitudes and beliefs about their regional 
security situation, and the two countries' similar ideology and outlook 
decreased tensions and fostered cooperation. As such, the two countries 
did not feel threatened by one another and sought out ways to deepen 
relations.20
Close relations continued during the 1960s, and the two countries deep-
ened security and diplomatic relations in the wake of the new policy of 
détente in the United States and Soviet Union. Spurred on by a large 
influx of petro-dollars during the oil crises in the 1970s, the Shah of Iran 
embarked upon a massive military modernization program. The Shah was 
seeking to replace the British as the guarantor of security for the small 
Gulf oil kingdoms. Gains made by the Soviet Union in the region, namely 
the conclusion of Friendship Treaties with India and Iraq, added to the 
Shah's sense of insecurity and hastened his resolve to build up the coun-
try's armed forces. Iran was seeking to control the Strait of Hormuz and 
the vital shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean. The Shah's ambitious mili-
tary program certainly piqued the interest of the Turkish armed forces, 
but the Shah's preoccupation with the Gulf States and the Persian/Ara-
bian Gulf did not immediately threaten Turkish interests in the region. 
Thus, Iran and Turkey maintained their close relations, despite the Shah's 
massive military modernization program.
The Islamic Revolution
Up until the Islamic Revolution, Turkey and Iran regarded each other as 
status quo powers in the Middle East that shared a common world out-
look and faced similar security threats. However, the Islamic Revolution 
changed the complexion of Iran's governing ideology and altered Iran's 
security policies. Ayatollah Khomeini's fiery rhetoric and desire to over-
throw the Gulf Oil sheikdoms ran counter to Turkey's non-interventionist 
foreign policy. Overnight, the new Islamic Republic adopted policies that 
were antithetical to Turkish interests in the Middle East, such as promot-
ing the eradication of the state of Israel and supporting proxy groups to 
export Iran's unique interpretation of Shi'ite Islam.
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In the aftermath of the Revolution, a number of Iranians fled to Turkey, 
raising suspicions that these groups of immigrants were sympathetic to 
the Islamic Revolution and could foment religious unrest in Turkey. Dur-
ing the 1980s, Turkey was experiencing a period of extreme domestic 
unrest. The domestic turmoil prompted the military to intervene and take 
over Turkey's elected government in 1980. This military takeover was 
compounded by the outbreak of violence in Eastern Turkey by members 
of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Khomeini's emphasis on export-
ing the Revolution naturally raised suspicions in secular Turkey. Ankara 
was wary of Khomeini's rhetoric and believed that Iran was allied with 
insurgent groups that would eventually target Turkey's secular Repub-
lic.21 Tensions were exacerbated after Ankara alleged Tehran's clandes-
tine support for the PKK.22 These accusations are notable because these 
two issues have dominated Turkey's national security policies since the 
founding of the Republic. Despite Ankara's allegations, Turkey main-
tained its "hands-off" policy in the Middle East and adopted a policy of 
neutrality during the Iran-Iraq war.23
Turkey maintained its policy of strict neutrality throughout the Iran-Iraq 
war. As a result, it was able to benefit economically because it was one of 
the few countries that did not join the global effort to economically isolate 
Iran. During the war, Iran emerged as Turkey's second largest supplier of 
natural gas, after Iraq. During the 1990s, trade between the two countries 
gradually increased. By 2000, it totaled nearly $1 billion. By 2005, it had 
increased to nearly $5 billion; and by 2008, it topped $10 billion annu-
ally.24 In 2010, trade dropped to $5.5 billion because of the global reces-
sion and the drop in oil and natural gas prices.25
The warming of relations was punctuated in August 2010, when the Turk-
ish Daily Milliyet reported that Turkey was expected to remove Iran from 
a watch list of countries that it considered to be a "specific threat."26 The 
updated security outlook was drafted by the country's powerful and influ-
ential National Security Council and was adopted in October 2010. The 
new review mentioned Iran's nuclear program, but did so as a part of Tur-
key's oft-repeated desire for a region free of nuclear weapons. The state-
ment was interpreted as a reference to Israel, which is believed to be the 
region's only nuclear-weapons state.27 The timing of the report coincided 
with a number of high-level talks between American and Turkish officials 
over Turkish-Iranian trade relations. Officials from the United States 
treasury had reportedly grown impatient with Ankara's robust trade with 
Turkey, despite U.S. and European Union sanctions meant to limit invest-
ment in Iran's oil and gas sector and their efforts to bar the export of 
refined petroleum to Iran.
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This expected move came only two months after Turkey, along with Bra-
zil, refused to support a fourth round of UN Security Council Sanctions 
against Iran for its refusal to freeze enrichment and answer a number of 
questions about suspected weaponization research. While Turkey is not a 
veto-holding member of the UNSC, meaning that its "no" vote could not 
derail the sanctions package, the United States and the European powers 
were seeking to pass the sanctions unanimously. The unanimous passage, 
they argued, increased Iran's isolation and was an important show of 
international consensus against Iran's enrichment program. Turkey's 
"no" vote set off a chorus of anti-Turkey rhetoric in the United States. The 
dominant story line, among Republican politicians and right-wing media 
pundits, was that Turkey was shunning its traditional Western allies 
because it was embracing an "Islamist ideology."
These recent events have given rise to a difficult time in U.S.-Turkish rela-
tions. During the Cold War, the alliance was cemented by Cold War poli-
tics, fears over the Soviet Union, and a general loathing of Communism. 
However, after the fall of Communism, the two allies have struggled to re-
define their relationship. The difficulties were punctuated during the run-
up to the second Gulf War. Despite massive political pressure and a $15 
billion dollar aid package, Turkey's Parliament failed to pass a bill that 
would have allowed American troops to invade Northern Iraq from Turk-
ish territory. Washington was stunned by the vote, and Former Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld went as far as to blame Turkey for the post-
war insurgency.
Tensions eased after the United States began supplying intelligence to 
Turkey that allowed its air force to bomb targets in Northern Iraq. The 
United States' commitment to repairing relations was underscored in 
April 2009 when newly-elected President Obama traveled to Turkey to 
reaffirm the Turkish-U.S. alliance and implore closer cooperation.28 
However, the euphoria surrounding Obama's visit was short-lived, and 
tension continued over Iran. These tensions have continued, and neither 
government appears to have a solution. The United States remains com-
mitted to its policy of coercion, while Turkey does not seem to be pre-
pared to "toe the policy line" espoused by the Western powers. As a result, 
tension over how to deal with Iran now dominates the relationship. This 
issue has clouded the fact that both countries have a mutual interest in 
maintaining friendly ties.
If the United States and Turkey were to better understand each other's 
intentions in the Middle East, both could work together to maximize their 
political self-interest. However, before this can happen, both countries 
have to reassess their immediate policy interests in the region. This 
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includes working together to solve the Iranian nuclear crisis, along with 
many of the other festering conflicts throughout the Middle East. If the 
United States can capitalize on Turkey's new diplomatic enthusiasm, it 
will benefit U.S. interests in the region. This will entail the United States 
recognizing and acknowledging Turkish interests and working to ensure 
that Turkey's immediate interests are enhanced by cooperating with the 
United States. This will not be an easy task and will entail both countries 
working more closely together.
Charting a New Path Forward: Redefining the U.S.-
Turkish Partnership
The first steps towards reconciliation should include a clear enumeration 
of each country's foreign policy objectives. The tenets of each other's for-
eign policy are well known and widely available, should one choose to 
look; however the United States and Turkey should restate their immedi-
ate and long-terms goals, the first of which should be the reconciliation of 
policy about Iran. This should take the form of an official communiqué 
from both governments and be reaffirmed through a series of official 
meetings designed to clarify questions about intent.
As of now, both countries share a common interest in ensuring that Iran 
does not acquire nuclear weapons. Turkey's President Abdullah Gul, 
despite supporting Iran's right to civilian nuclear technology, has indi-
cated his support for a Middle East nuclear weapons-free zone in numer-
ous interviews and during his speech to the United Nations.29 
Unfortunately, his recent calls come at a time when Turkey's relations 
with Israel have deteriorated. This has led to the widespread belief that 
Turkey is making a concerted effort to equate Iran's nuclear program with 
Israel's. In the United States, policymakers are growing increasingly frus-
trated with this stance because they do not want to equate Iran's nuclear 
program with Israel's. Instead, they wish to decouple the two issues and 
rally a coalition to continue its policy of "containment." This is reflective 
of the United States' long-held strategic objectives in the region. Turkey's 
recent foray into Israeli-Palestinian issues has upset Washington and, 
more importantly, goes against one of the major pillars in American for-
eign policy, namely the maintenance of Israel's military superiority vis-à-
vis its Arab neighbors.
The diplomatic rhetoric has resulted in the Iranian and Israeli issues 
being connected. Thus, both sides expect some sort of concession on one 
issue before being prepared to make concessions on the other. This tit-
for-tat thinking is counterproductive and limits the effectiveness of U.S.-
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Turkish policy in the Middle East. In the interests of maximizing their 
policy interests, the United States and Turkey should make an effort to 
decouple Israel from their immediate policy issues in the Middle East. 
First, the United States should reiterate its support for the full implemen-
tation of the 1995 NPT Review Conference Resolution that "calls upon all 
States in the Middle East to take practical steps towards the establish-
ment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass 
destruction."30 The United States did as much when it supported a UN 
Security Council Resolution reaffirming support for the 1995 Resolution 
in May 2010.31 This statement echoes those of Gul and should serve as the 
basis for a complementary nonproliferation policy in the Middle East. 
These goals should be expanded upon and reiterated in a series of track 
one and track two diplomatic meetings that focus on the future of the 
Middle East, and on how the U.S. and Turkey can cooperate to achieve 
their objectives.
Secondly, the United States should take advantage of the recent fuel-swap 
arrangement that Turkey and Brazil negotiated with Iran in order to help 
resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis. The tepid response to Brazil's and 
Turkey's agreement with Iran cannot be taken back, but the United States 
could use Turkey's diplomatic credibility to further talks with Iran. For 
example, Iran has recently stated its willingness to return to talks over its 
nuclear program.32 Thus far the United States has reaffirmed their 
commitment to renewed negotiations with Iran, did not mention 
imposing specific sanctions should these upcoming talks fail, and have 
indicated that a revised and updated agreement to deliver uranium fuel 
rods could be part of a confidence-building measure before many of the 
core issues are addressed.33 As a first step, the United States and its 
Western allies could honor Iran's willingness to ship 1,200 kg of low-
enriched uranium (LEU) to Turkey, in exchange for fuel rods for the 
Tehran Research Reactor.34
Critics of the deal are correct when they claim that the deal has little non-
proliferation value because it does little to slow Iran's controversial 
nuclear program. Experts estimate that a country like Iran would need 
1,200 kg of LEU to produce enough fissile material for one nuclear 
weapon, should Iran decide to enrich its LEU to 90 percent. When the 
Declaration was concluded, the IAEA had reported that Iran had accumu-
lated 2,300 kg of LEU. The removal of 1,200 kg of LEU would allow Iran 
to replenish its LEU stockpile quickly, thus negating the nonproliferation 
benefits of the fuel-swap arrangement.35
The deal's intended purpose, when the permanent members of the UN 
Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) first proposed it in October 2009, 
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was a confidence-building mechanism meant to temporarily remove the 
possibility that Iran could further enrich its stockpiled LEU for a nuclear 
weapon. The United States and other members of the P5+1, including 
Russia, were quick to point out the Declaration's deficiencies. However, 
these probing criticisms disregarded Turkey's official policy on the sub-
ject. Ahmet Davutoglu, in an official statement released on the Turkish 
Foreign Ministry's website, pointed out that "critics of the Tehran declara-
tion refer to the fact that it does not treat all problems surrounding Iran's 
nuclear program. This was never the purpose of the original agreement. 
But we [Turkey] believe that the declaration helps to address the entire 
issue by providing essential confidence-building, the key missing compo-
nent thus far."36 
Turkey argues that the P5+1 had been pursuing this deal, but had been 
unable to convince Iran to agree. Despite the likelihood that Iran was try-
ing to derail the forthcoming UN sanctions, the fact remains that Turkey 
was able to convince Iran to ship out 1,200 kg of LEU in one shipment to a 
neutral third party. Up until this point, the P5+1 were unable to convince 
Iran to ship out its LEU to a neutral third site in one batch. Turkey argues 
that this agreement should be thought of as a first step towards achieving 
an overall diplomatic settlement. Davutoglu's website article, entitled 
"Giving Diplomacy a Chance," reflects the theoretical underpinning of the 
AK Party's foreign policy. In the interim, the United States should take 
advantage of Turkey's willingness and ability to engage Iran on sensitive 
issues. The P5+1 should invite Turkey and Brazil to the latest round of 
talks about Iran's nuclear program. As a starting point for new negotia-
tions, the P5+1 should use the text of the Iran-Turkey-Brazil Declaration. 
The P5+1 should be prepared to accept an initial delivery of 1,200 kg of 
LEU, in exchange for a promise that Iran will accede to the IAEA's Addi-
tional Protocols and abide by the internationally accepted definition of 
Article 3.1 of its nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA.37 If Iran 
were to accept these terms, it would be an important first step and help 
build confidence. It would also serve the United States and Turkey's over-
all strategic objectives. Turkey would have helped register a "diplomatic 
win" without the use of force, and the United States would have severely 
limited Iran's ability to quickly produce a nuclear weapon, and at the 
same time preserved Israeli security.
By including Turkey in the negotiations, the P5+1 gain a negotiating part-
ner that has proven itself to be committed to strengthening its relations 
with Iran, while still pursuing a negotiated settlement to the nuclear cri-
sis. Turkey's previous success could help break the cycle of negative reci-
procity, and may lead to each side's making concessions. In short, any 
effort to break the persistence of zero-sum thinking can help move diplo-
Stein: Resetting U.S.-Turkish Relations: Charting a New Way Forward
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
Journal of Strategic Security
14
matic processes forward and help contribute to an eventual agreement. If 
Turkey were to be included in the talks, the United States and other mem-
bers of the P5+1 could help shape the trajectory and positions of all of the 
negotiating parties. This would help unify the negotiating position of all 
parties involved and help create more transparency among all parties 
about their ultimate intentions.
Conclusion: Identifying Common Interests
The divergence in opinion over the United States' and Turkey's Middle 
East policies stems from an ideological difference over how to implement 
foreign policy. The United States has long favored a policy of coercion, 
while Turkey has turned its back on this policy and is now convinced that 
"soft power" is best suited to achieving its objectives. Despite this, the two 
countries share an overwhelming interest in maintaining friendly ties and 
working together in the Middle East. In order to maintain these relations, 
both countries have to work together to clearly enumerate each other's 
immediate interests, identify areas of convergence, and respect areas of 
disagreement.
The most practical method moving forward is to decouple the Israeli issue 
from broader Middle East issues, quickly followed by working together to 
resolve the dispute over Iran's nuclear program. By doing so, the allies 
can redefine their alliance to meet the challenges each country faces in the 
21st century. In the absence of the Communist threat, the two allies can 
chart a new path forward that favors regional diplomacy and the pursuit 
of each other's interests. This will necessitate a more open dialogue on 
each side that downplays Turkey's religion and the United States' coercive 
policy, in favor of each other's complementary interests. The fact of the 
matter remains that the two countries share more interests than differ-
ences over the threats and opportunities they face.
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